Policy gate
local_only_v1
v1.2- L-1Inference must run on GW_Edge local.allow
- L-2No cloud egress for this data class.deny
- L-3Outbound DNS limited to allowlist.allow
- L-4Receipt sealed on each material step.allow
Solution · Local AI Trust
Local execution is not enough. Local trust has to be proven.
Running inference locally reduces some exposure. It does not, on its own, create trust. A local workflow still needs policy enforcement, identity, human approval, egress controls, outcome grading, and receipts that prove what ran, what was touched, why it was allowed, and what changed.
Answer
Sovereign-resident inference still inherits GW Slate™: session identity, allowlisted egress, fail-closed tool calls, and receipts sealed on the same ground the model ran. The Team Control Sprint proves that stack on one workflow.
What local trust requires
- Policy enforced at the local runtime.
- Identity bound per session.
- Human approval where the policy requires it.
- Egress controls verified, not assumed.
- Outcome grading on every run.
- Receipts signed locally and independently verifiable.
In operation
Local runtime, egress denied, receipt sealed.
Receipt· rcpt_local_…ab
LOCAL · ALLOWED- Runtime
- GW_Edge · CUDA · sealed
- Egress
- blocked · per policy
- Approval
- policy-only · no human required
- Outcome grade
- A · safety
- Receipt id
- AR-77c1…ab
Why local alone isn't trust
The wins of local don't add up to governed.
Local can still exfiltrate.
Egress controls have to be enforced and proven.
Local can still violate brand.
Brand binding is a policy property, independent of where the model runs.
Local can still skip approvals.
Approval lives on the workflow.
Local can still be opaque.
Receipts are what make a local run reviewable.
Trusted local loop
How GlobalizeWe makes local AI inspectable.
- 01STEPIdentity bindPer-session identity at the local runtime.
- 02PASSPolicy bindLocal policy pack signed and loaded.
- 03PASSEgress fenceOutbound traffic restricted by allowlist.
- 04PASSInferenceLocal model, sealed runtime.
- 05GATEApprovalHuman gate when policy requires.
- 06PASSGradeOutcome grade across dimensions.
- 07PASSReceiptSealed locally, tamper-evident.
- 08STEPRevocationIdentity / model / policy revocable at the edge.
What you get
A local stack the control functions can inspect.
Sealed runtime
Local model + GW Slate sealed against unauthorized changes.
Proven egress
Outbound traffic policy is enforced and tested.
Identity per session
Short-lived identity rotated for each run.
Approval surface
Human approval when policy requires, even on local runs.
Outcome grades
Grades produced locally without leaking content.
Receipts at the edge
Receipts signed on your own hardware, verifiable by the parties you share them with.
Buyer-specific examples
Chief Technology Officer
What does GW Slate™ give a CTO?
A controller they command: custom rails over the estate they already run, policy gates on every route, and Actuality Receipts that prove the work. Human-at-the-Control stays in the architecture, so engineering authority scales with the estate.
- Custom rails over the current stack
- Policy-gated routing they can audit
- Actuality Receipts on material actions
- Human-at-the-Control on irreversible steps
From the Magazine
Canonical pieces on this rail. Each magazine URL is the home; Substack is distribution.
Prove local trust on one workflow.
We run one workflow on a sealed local stack with egress fences and a receipt packet.